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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I present a relation between two principles on individuals that John Rawls 
presented in his two major works. First one is natural duty of justice in A Theory of 
Justice and second one is moral duty of civility in Political Liberalism. I start with the 
claim that natural duty of justice is the best answer to the problem of legitimacy of liberal 
institutions posed by A. John Simmons. But, in the circumstances of reasonable pluralism 
it is not clear how can such a vague duty guide us in political reasoning. That is why I 
claim that moral duty of civility, which demands that we respect boundaries of public 
reason, is the way how we fulfill our natural duty of justice in circumstances of reasonable 
pluralism. This implies that moral duty of civility has its moral grounding in natural duty 
of justice. Then I try to present how this view can answer to some objections raised 
against the idea of public reason and also how it can refers to some problems of 
distributive justice. 
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The main question of political liberalism is: ‘How should citizens who adhere 
to different comprehensive doctrines or have different conceptions of good 
but in the same time share collective political power through public 
institutions over each other live together and legitimately exercise this 
political power on each other?’ For political liberalism it is not enough simply 
to set out an account of how people should order their public institutions. It 
is not enough to give an account of right principles of justice or an account of 
right conception of social justice. Political liberalism emphasizes that 
justification of political power should also include an account of the reasons 
the persons who live there have, or should have, for affirming those 
particular institutions. This extra element is provided by principle of 
legitimacy. More precisely with principle of liberal legitimacy which states that 
“our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
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accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason” (Rawls, 1993, 137). 
By emphasizing the problem of legitimatizing political power and not 
solely to justify best public institutions or principles of justice political 
liberalism is more sensitive to the problem of distinction between justification 
and legitimacy that was raised by A. John Simmons. Simmons points out 
that it is wrong to conflate justification with legitimacy because what 
justifies an institution is not what legitimates an institution. Justification of 
institutions “typically involves showing it to be prudentially rational, 
morally acceptable, or both” (Simmons, 1999, 740). Legitimacy is the 
complex moral right institution possess to be the exclusive imposer of 
binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with its duties, and 
to use coercion to enforce the duties. Such complex moral right institutions 
earn, according to Simmons, “by virtue of the unanimous consent of their 
members, a consent that transfers to the collectivity those rights whose 
exercise by central authority is necessary for viable political society” (Ibid, 
747). Justifications appeal to an institution’s virtues, goodness, or other 
beneficial qualities. Legitimacy, by contrast, is achieved only by the consent 
of the governed. Simmons states that the big problem in contemporary 
liberal theory is that “the question about justification and the question about 
legitimacy are simply being conflated, so that the distinction between 
justification and legitimacy is being collapsed entirely” (Ibid, 757). This 
conflation of justification and legitimacy can pose big problem for liberals 
who emphasize the importance of justifying coercion exercised by shared 
political institutions. In the same way some Business Company can also be 
justified on prudential grounds if it provides goods or services better than 
any alternative company and individuals will more likely achieve their ends 
if they are clients of that company. Also, Company can be justified on moral 
grounds if for example it treats its employers on fair way or if it donates some 
money to the charity. But, it would be wrong, and certainly illiberal, to claim 
that because of this prudential and moral grounds Company has right to bill 
persons who did not voluntarily agreed to be its clients and to coerce this 
persons to behave according to Company rules. If this conclusion in respect 
to the Company is wrong then it is also wrong to conclude that political 
institutions earn such moral rights over their subjects that did not 
voluntarily agreed to live under them independently of institution’s 
prudential and moral virtues. What is needed is further condition that asks 
for voluntary consent of persons living under that institution. We can name 
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this problem as voluntarism challenge1 - how can liberal institutions gain any 
legitimate authority over citizens without their actual consent? Since very 
few liberal institutions truly gain actual consent from their citizens it seems 
that many institutions are not legitimate. For liberals of any sort this is very 
awkward conclusion that they certainly do not want to accept. It seems that 
exercise of political power and liberal institutions are legitimate even without 
actual voluntary consent. But in providing their account of legitimacy of 
institutions liberals must answer to the voluntarism challenge.  
In answering to this challenge we can take two routes: we can base 
legitimate authority on practical reason or we can base legitimate authority 
on natural duties. To notice the difference between these two approaches I 
will follow Jonathan Quong’s way in addressing this problem.2 He claims 
that we need to distinguish between three questions: 
“1) What should I do? 
2) What does justice requires me to do? 
3) Who has the legitimate authority to decide what I must do?” (Quong, 
2011, 118) 
Practical reason models of legitimacy claim that the answer to the 
question (3) depends on the answer to question (1). Legitimate authority of 
person A over person B is established if B will likely better comply with 
reasons which apply to him if he accepts the directives of A rather than by 
trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. What is important 
to notice is that the question ‘What should I do?’ means ‘What should I 
rationally do?’ where there is no difference between moral reasons and all 
reasons for action. If this is right way to establish legitimate authority than 
in political domain where we are establishing legitimate authority of liberal 
institutions we can present this model in three theses: 
a) There is criterion according to which citizens are rational if they act in 
compliance with reasons they have. 
b) Liberal institutions can help citizens to comply with their reasons 
better then they will do it if they follow their reasons directly. 
c) Because liberal institutions can help citizens to follow their reasons 
better then they will do it themselves they have legitimate authority over 
citizens.  
Now, even though we can accept theses a) and b), problem is with theses 
c). Namely, it is not clear how complex moral right to impose obligations and 
coerce individuals to respect these obligations can be established by showing 
that someone or some institution is better expert than certain individual 
                                                            
1 Quong (2011, 109) calls it Simmons challenge. 
2 Quong (2011, ch.4) 
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herself (and this is what premises (a) and (b) claim). Maybe for this individual 
it is prudent or rational to listen to directives of experts or institutions but 
prudence and rationality cannot simply be translated to legitimacy of 
practical authority. This is what David Estlund calls expert/boss fallacy - “To 
the person who knows better, the other might hope to say, ‘You might be 
right, but who made you the boss” (Estlund, 2008, 40)? Citizens cannot 
legitimately exercise their collective political power over each other through 
shared liberal institutions if that legitimacy is established on reasons for 
action that apply to other citizens by stating that other citizens will better 
comply with their own reasons. Even if their collective acting can be 
beneficial to every individual citizen one can always say that she does not see 
this collective body as boss who is she obliged to listen and which can coerce 
her to follow its directives. For this collective body to be the boss what is 
needed is voluntary acceptance of its authority – so we are back with the 
problem of voluntarism challenge.  
The other problem for practical reason models of legitimacy that is 
connected to expert/boss fallacy is problem of paternalism. As Quong states: 
“The problem with all such models is that they fail to explain why the brute 
fact that I have reason to do something should affect what rights you have 
with regard to me” (Quong, 2011, 115). The problem is very important 
because the rights we are talking about are rights to impose demands and use 
coercion to secure that individual will fulfill these demands. Justifying 
nonconsensual coercion in terms of potential benefits to the coerced is clear 
case of paternalism.3 This is how we behave with children and mentally 
disabled (in certain circumstances), but this kind of behavior toward adults 
who are fully capable members of social cooperation is clearly illiberal, 
particularly in the circumstances of reasonable pluralism where individuals 
will most likely differently weight potential harms and benefits in their own 
conception of good life.  
Alternative way to establish legitimacy that answers to voluntaristic 
challenge and avoids paternalism is that question ‘Who has legitimate 
authority to decide what I must do?’ depends on the answer to question 
‘What justice requires me to do?’ Justice is concerned to the treatment of 
others in terms of rights and duties. As Quong writes:  
“If we want to know who has the legitimate authority over some domain, 
we need to know what justice permits and requires with regard to that 
domain…The only kinds of reasons that can justify legitimate authority are 
                                                            
3 This problem is emphasized by Christopher Wellman in Simmons and Wellman (2005, 
18). 
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thus the reasons that pertain to answering question (2): reasons that 
determine the allocation of rights and duties” (Quong, 2011, 119).  
Thus, legitimate authority cannot be established by referring to any kind 
of reasons to action but to particular set of reasons, namely duties we have 
toward others and correlated rights others have. To establish legitimate 
authority of liberal institutions we must appeal to duties every individual has 
toward others that he can best fulfill by accepting authority of these 
institutions. Duty based model of legitimacy can address voluntarism 
challenge because fulfilling duty is not up to individual to decide – “To be 
under a duty to perform some act for someone else means precisely that the 
duty – bearer lacks the right to decide whether or not to perform”(Quong, 
2011, 127). Of course, the main question is what is the nature of duty on 
which we can base legitimacy that can answer to voluntarism challenge? 
Since my concern in this article is Rawls’s idea of political liberalism I will 
focus on his proposals. 
In his article from 1964. ‘Legal Obligations and Duty of Fair Play’ Rawls 
emphasizes principle of fairness which claims that if persons enjoy benefits of 
cooperation then they have a duty of fair play to perform or give their fair 
share in cooperation: 
“Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social 
cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only be obtained if 
everyone, or nearly everyone cooperates. Suppose further that cooperation 
requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a certain 
restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally the benefits produced by 
cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation 
is unstable in the sense that if any one person knows that all (or nearly all) of 
the others will continue to do their part, he will still be able to share a gain 
from the scheme even if he does not do his part. Under these conditions a 
person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair 
play to do his part and not to take advantage of the free benefit by not 
cooperating”(Rawls, 1964/1999, 122). 
Thus, we have a duty to give our fair share in cooperation which implies 
that institutions that coordinate cooperation have legitimate authority 
because in their absence it would be hard if not impossible under 
circumstances of social complexities to determine what a fair share is. Our 
non consent to authority of institutions is null because we are under a duty to 
give our fair share and we can do it only if we accept authority of 
institutions. But, of course, problem with this proposal is that duty of fair 
play applies to us only if we already voluntarily consented to enter into 
cooperation with others. Duty of fair play depends on our prior voluntary act 
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and that is why it cannot be good solution to the problem posed by 
voluntarism challenge.  
To answer to voluntarism challenge we must rely on duties that we do 
not acquire by our prior voluntary acts. Of course, these duties are known as 
natural duties that apply to us simply because we are (moral) persons. To 
present natural duties I will use well known example from literature, accident 
case. Imagine a person A come to the scene of accident where there are 
injured people and that person can help them without too much cost to 
himself. We assume that this person has duty to aid these people even if he is 
not in any causal connection with accident. In this sense we can say that this 
person has natural duty to aid and duty not to cause unnecessary harm and 
that he will be blameworthy if he does not help them. We can say that act of 
not helping would be morally wrong. Now, imagine another person B also 
arriving at a scene of accident but this person has some medical knowledge, 
she is a nurse, and this person knows better how to help these people and not 
to cause additional harm. Person B issues directives to person A what to do 
and how to help people. Can in this case A reply: “Well, I know you are 
expert, but why am I obliged to accept your authority if I did not consent to 
it? I will help them in my own way by spreading positive energy and you 
have no right to coerce me to do what you tell me.” So, A accepts that it 
would be wrong not to help victims but claims that B has no right to coerce 
him how is he going to help them. But, if obeying B is the only way how A 
can fulfill this duty, than not obeying B, not accepting authority of B, is 
equally morally wrong as not helping the victims. B can coerce A to do as she 
says without violating any of A’s rights because she is only ensuring that B 
complies with duties (and not any kind of reasons for action) he is already 
under.  
Now we can answer to voluntarism challenge. First, justification of B as 
the best source of directives lies in her ability (as nurse). Second, A should 
accept her authority not because of his rationality, but because it is the only 
way in which he can fulfill his duty that does not come out of any of his prior 
voluntary acts. His non-consent on B’s authority violates his duty and that 
is why it is immoral. Immorality of his act of non-consent is the condition 
that makes act of non-consent null, independently of any voluntary act. 
Also, difference with duty of fair play is that A should consent on B’s 
directives regardless of fact that he is in any cooperative scheme with 
victims. Natural duties we do not owe only to others with who we already are 
in cooperation but to all individuals generally.  
Now, we can draw an analogy between accident case and political 
domain. In A Theory of Justice Rawls states that beside natural duties to aid 
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and not to cause unnecessary harm to others, every individual has a natural 
duty of justice. This natural duty describes our duties in regard to justice. As 
Rawls writes: 
“This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions 
that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements 
not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to 
ourselves. Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is 
reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do 
his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions 
independent of his voluntary acts” (Rawls, 1971, 99). 
As Jonathan Quong explains this duty of justice: 
“ If there is some just institution X that is necessary to secure the basic 
rights and claims of person P, than person P has a claim against everyone 
else to support and comply with institution X insofar as this is necessary to 
maintain X and does not come at unreasonable cost to others. Each person 
whose rights and claims are secured by X has a similar claim against others. 
It thus follows that if we fail to fulfill our natural duty of justice, we fail to 
provide specific others with what we owe them as matter of justice” (Quong, 
2011, 128). 
Thus, if person is under a duty to provide others with what we owe them 
as matters of justice, and if there is an agent that can coordinate how best to 
fulfill this than we are required to obey that agent and to recognize its 
authority. If that agent is coercing us to follow her directives than she is not 
violating any of our rights because we do not have right not to fulfill our 
duty.  
In circumstances of pluralism of various conceptions of good and socially 
complex interconnections we are unable to judge by ourselves what justice 
requires.4 Because of complexity and unpredictability of our interactions and 
transactions in modern circumstances it is practically impossible to demand 
from individuals to have all information about possible moral implications of 
their acts. Jon Mandle nicely explains this problem with a simple case: 
“Spending a dollar on certain groceries may be morally innocuous when 
we confine our view to the local context. But if, along with similar behavior 
on the part of many others, that purchase serves to enrich the owner of a 
farm which, in turn, gives him unfair bargaining advantage over his workers 
                                                            
4 For example, Ronald Dworkin states this problem clearly: “We may try to loive with 
only the resources we think we would have in a fair society doing the best we can with the 
surplus, to repair injustice through private charity. But, since a just distribution can only 
be established through just institutions, we are unable to judge what share of our wealth is 
fair“ (Dworkin, 2002, 265).  
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whom he then exploits, it may not be as innocuous. Yet, we cannot expect 
individuals to anticipate all the ways in which their behavior might combine 
with that of others to generate undesired or unacceptable consequences” 
(Mandle, 2000, 26). 
Fortunately, there is an agent that is capable of imposing a distribution 
among citizens of rights and duties and conducting fair political deliberation 
on equitable distribution of goods. Of course, this agent is the state, or we can 
say in rawlsian terms basic structure of society which consists from liberal 
institutions.5    
It is important to notice that natural duty of justice has two parts. First 
part says that we have to comply with just institutions when they exist and 
apply to us. Second part says that we have to further just arrangements not 
yet established, i.e. to help establish just institutions where they do not yet 
exist. Important thing to notice is that first part does not have qualification 
of cost, while the second part has – so, we have to help establish just 
institutions where they do not yet exist “when this can be done without too 
much cost to ourselves.” This qualification of cost is important because 
without it, second part of natural duty of justice would be supererogatory. 
We consider individuals as Martin Luther King, Sophie Scholl or Mahatma 
Gandhi as moral heroes because they suffered heavy costs in their effort to 
establish just institutions in circumstances of unjust regimes. It would be 
wrong to say that they were just fulfilling their duty of justice that equally 
applies to all individuals in these regimes and that individuals who didn’t 
bear such burden are all equally blameworthy in not fulfilling their duty of 
justice. Two parts of natural duty of justice thus, differently apply on 
individuals depending on circumstances of actual regimes in which 
individuals live. First part, because it does not have any qualification of cost, 
applies more strongly to individuals living in ideally well – ordered society 
where institutions through public deliberation assigned what burden of 
cooperation is fair on the basis of reciprocity. In this case qualification of cost 
is unnecessary because not accepting fair cost is by definition unfair. We can 
say that there is correlate negative duty on individuals not to impose unfair 
                                                            
5 There is another problem for account of legitimacy based on natural duty of justice. 
Problem is that we owe this duty to every individual so it is hard how can this duty 
require to respect institutions of our society and not institutions that are just wherever in 
the world they are. This is so called Particularity objection (see Simmons in Simmons and 
Wellman, 2005). I will not deal with this problem here but there are many responses given 
to this objection such as Quong (2011, 129-131), Estlund (2008, 147-151), Risse (2012, ch. 
16), Waldron (1993). 
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burdens to others. This duty we can respect passively, simply by following 
directives of just institutions. But, in non-ideal circumstances where 
institutions are not distributing fair shares of cooperation and when this 
distribution is not respecting the process of political deliberation between free 
and equal citizens than we have a more stronger positive duty to help 
establish institutions that will be more just. This duty involves more active 
citizenship because it includes duty to engage in political activity to establish 
just institutions and to assure that they collect and distribute fair shares. 
There is also, I believe, negative correlate to this positive duty. As Charles 
Fried says – “there is personal duty not only to comply with the norms of 
existing institutions but also in appropriate situations to resist them in order 
to move them in the direction of justice” (Fried, 1978, 129). This means that 
we have negative duty in appropriate situation not to collaborate in the 
design or imposition of institutions that foreseeable and avoidably cause 
injustice.6 In these negative formulation clause ‘in the appropriate situation’ 
has same role as qualification of cost in positive formulation. Of course, it 
leaves some discretion to individuals to decide whether they are 
appropriately situated to resist or not to collaborate in the same way there is 
some discretion on individuals to see what too much cost is that they have to 
bear in furthering just arrangements. But, certainly we can say that citizens 
who already enjoy certain benefits from unjust arrangements and have more 
political influence in decision making (and these are rich and upper middle 
class citizens in contemporary capitalist societies) are appropriately situated 
and that they violate their duty if they collaborate with or support existing 
unjust arrangement. Citizens who are in bad position because of unjust 
arrangement are most likely not equally appropriately situated to resist or 
change existing arrangement and it certainly sounds cynical to say that 
because they passively accept it they collaborate with or support a regime. 
Discretion left to individuals to estimate what is too much cost is not 
unlimited discretion that refers to any cost to individuals’ interests. If, for 
example, in the process of voting individual chooses between two 
alternatives, A and B, and he thinks that A is more just option but he still 
votes for B because B promotes better his interests than this individual 
violates duty of justice irrespectively of his social position.  
Authority of basic structure comes out of our duty of justice and that 
gives it moral right to govern our conduct. Of course, basic structure must be 
just. In the text below there will be more said what it means that basic 
structure is just, but first we must say that for political liberalism the most 
abstract conception of justice is justice as reciprocity. That means that 
                                                            
6 This idea is most recently expressed in Pogge(2011, 17).  
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society must be organized as fair system of cooperation. Cooperation means 
that “all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the rules 
and procedures require are to benefit in appropriate way”(Rawls, 1996, 16). 
To avoid above mentioned expert/boss fallacy it is important to see who 
determines rules and procedures of cooperation. According to political 
liberalism this rules must be publicly justified which means they cannot 
appeal to our private reasons because than we will fall again into expert/boss 
fallacy. Public justification according to political liberalism appeals to shared 
set of political values or public reasons.7 
Only in this way can political power of authority be justified. In liberal 
democratic regimes the final political power lies in the hands of citizens and 
they exercise it on each other. Political institutions must be justified to 
citizens. This is captured in Rawls’ liberal principle of legitimacy with which 
we started– our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is 
exercised in accordance with constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles 
and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. 
The question is now why we need this principle? We said that 
justification of legitimate authority is based on demands of justice; the 
answer on question ‘Who has legitimate authority?’ depends on the answer 
what justice demands from citizens to do. In answering that question we 
invoked natural duty to uphold and establish just institutions. We said that 
subject of justice is basic structure and that the concept of justice is justice as 
reciprocity. But, according to discussion so far it looks like it is enough to 
find what justice requires, that is conception of justice that truly is just and 
on the basis of it justify state action or authority of basic structure. To those 
who do not accept obligations or rules, we can say that they should accept it 
on the grounds of natural duty of justice. Why to appeal to liberal principle 
of legitimacy when we already have natural duty of justice? Or to put this 
question in other words, how from duty of justice that demands to support 
just regime we can derive principle of legitimacy that demands to support 
legitimate regime? If we return to the case of accident we can form question 
in this way – did not the authority of nurse come out of the fact that she 
knows how best to help the victims, and not from fulfilling some further 
condition that the helper reasonably accept her directives? 
                                                            
7 In contemporary debate on public reason this is highly contested issue. But, here I follow 
'orthodox' rawlsian understanding of idea of public reason, so I accept this idea of 
shareability without enetering into this complex discussion. For this discussion, for 
example, see Quong (2011, ch. 9) and Gaus (2011, ch. 14). 
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The answer to this question from the standpoint of political liberalism is 
very simple. In liberal societies characterized with reasonable pluralism there 
is no persons or groups that, like nurse in accident case, know best what 
justice demands or which specific conception of justice is the true one and 
such that everyone must accept it to fulfill duty of justice. Such conception 
we can call perfect conception of justice.8 In reasonable pluralism characterized 
by different metaphysical, religious and philosophical doctrines there are 
many such perfect conceptions of justice. For example, hedonistic utilitarian 
perfect conception of justice is based on principle of maximizing happiness, 
catholic perfect conception of justice is based on natural law, also Rawls’s 
justice as fairness as presented in A Theory of Justice is based on our nature as 
autonomous beings and so on. Every perfect conception of justice can first 
justify principles on justice on the basis of these deeper teaching, but also 
second, it can usually justify concrete political decisions or laws (issues such 
as homosexual marriage; forbidding neo-fascist marches or certain level of 
taxing) also on the basis of these deeper premises. For example, Catholics can 
say that it is inadmissible to recognize same sex marriages because it is 
contrary to natural law while hedonistic utilitarian can defend such 
marriages by appealing to maximization of happiness. But, on what grounds 
can they justify their authority in imposing these decisions? They cannot 
appeal to natural duty of justice because demands of justice are not demands 
to accept certain religious or philosophical teaching. To claim such thing 
means that they do not truly accept pluralism and, also they are ready to 
rely upon oppressive power that can establish de facto authority, but it 
cannot establish authority as moral power. This is example of expert/boss 
fallacy where certain groups can be presented as experts on what certain 
doctrine demands but this does not give them power to issue directives to 
others that do not accept such teachings. Political liberalism accepts both 
idea of public justification and idea of reasonable pluralism so it cannot 
accept basic structure of society and concrete political decisions to be 
dependent on perfect conception of justice. 
Political liberalism demands that conception of justice must be based on 
reciprocity which implies that it must arrange fair social cooperation between 
free and equal citizens in the circumstances of reasonable pluralism. There 
will be family of specific conceptions of justice that can satisfy this more 
abstract conception of justice as reciprocity. But, every conception from this 
family is characterized by three features or three liberal principles: (i) it 
assigns citizens certain basic rights and liberties; (ii) assigns those rights and 
                                                            
8 Quong (2011, 131-135) also notes this difference between perfect and reasonable 
conception of justice but in a slightly different way. 
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liberties special priority; and (iii) provides citizens with adequate, all-purpose 
means to make use of those rights and liberties. Furthermore, concrete 
political decisions must be justified, not on deeper moral of religious grounds, 
but in terms of this various conceptions of justice. In other words, they must 
be justified on grounds of political values and public reasons. Conceptions of 
justice based solely on political values solely will be reasonable conceptions of 
justice and not perfect conceptions of justice. They are reasonably just 
because they do not derive from some deeper teachings but from political 
values that constitute reasonableness itself – freedom, equality and fairness. 
Also, they are reasonable conceptions of justice because concrete political 
decisions they justify can even be in conflict with some deeper teachings or 
world-views, but still be considered as just to some extent. For example, it is 
possible that by appealing to basic rights and freedoms such conception will 
defend same sex marriages but that will be in conflict with catholic teaching. 
What are not in conflict with catholic teaching are basic rights and freedoms 
themselves. According to political liberalism catholic citizens could accept 
such decision as reasonably just although not perfectly just. To avoid 
unjustified coercion and oppression over pluralism all justification must be 
based on political values and that is what principle of liberal legitimacy 
demands. We can say that legitimate authority of institutions based on 
natural duty of justice in circumstances of reasonable pluralism is established 
if these institutions are reasonably just or if they implement reasonable 
conception of justice as described above. Reasonable conception of justice is 
one that is based on principle of liberal legitimacy. 
Principle of liberal legitimacy implies duty which citizens of liberal plural 
societies have as citizens, and that is moral duty of civility – “to be able to 
explain to one another on this fundamental question how the principles and 
policies they advocate can be supported by the political values of public 
reason”(Rawls, 1996, 217).  
There are two important aspects of moral duty of civility – epistemic 
restraint and sincerity. Epistemic restraint means that citizens should not 
appeal to what they see as the whole truth from their comprehensive 
perspective. Non- public reasons should not enter into political justification 
simply because they are part of true comprehensive doctrine. Truth of 
comprehensive doctrine is part of reasonable disagreement and that is why it 
cannot be public reason we can expect all reasonable citizens can accept. 
Epistemic restraint is closely connected to the second important aspect of 
moral duty of civility, and that is sincerity requirement. When we offer 
political proposals or reasons for these proposals to others “we should 
sincerely think that our view of the matter is based on political values that 
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everyone can be reasonably expected to endorse” (Rawls, 1996, 241). The 
reason for sincerity requirement is nicely stated by Quong: 
“If we acted insincerely toward other citizens, if we offered arguments we 
believed to be invalid, or which we believed others had no good reason to 
accept, we would fail to respect their status as citizens who can understand 
and respond to moral reasons, and are owed justifications for the rules that 
regulate social cooperation” (Quong, 2011, 266). 
By respecting duty of civility, we respect the framework within which we 
address matters of social justice. It is the framework of moral reasoning that 
citizens as collective body use when they address questions of justice. This 
framework is well known Rawls’s idea of public reason. So, public reason 
requires that we bracket those elements of our full comprehensive doctrine 
that not all reasonable people share, and to the extent possible, take our 
normative premises only from the idea of the reasonable itself.  
First thing important to notice is that duty of civility by which we 
respect the framework of public reason is moral duty and not a legal duty. If 
it was a legal duty then it would be in contrast with some of the most 
important liberal rights and liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom 
of consciousness. It is not a restriction of what can be said in public. The 
purpose of it is to distinguish good or, we can say, legitimate political 
arguments from bad ones in circumstances of reasonable pluralism. As Jon 
Mandle nicely states this: “Rawls no more advocates enforcing legal 
restrictions against violations of public reason than he advocates enforcing 
them against affirming the consequent” (Mandle, 2000, 77).  
Second important thing is that moral duty of civility does not demand 
from citizens always to respect boundaries of public reason when they 
address questions of justice. The boundaries of public reason and duty of 
civility more strongly applies to judges and public officials than to citizens. 
Rawls is clear in saying that citizens are allowed to introduce into political 
discussion comprehensive beliefs and to vote on these reasons “provided that 
in due course public reasons, given by reasonable conception, are presented 
sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to 
support” (Rawls, 1996, xli). He is not particularly clear about exact meaning 
of this proviso. It is not clear what exactly means that citizens must in ‘due 
course’ give public reason. I agree with Paul Weithman’s interpretation of 
proviso to mean that citizens are allowed to rely on “their comprehensive 
doctrines – including very fully comprehensive doctrines – without adducing 
public reasons in support of their positions, so long as their doing so does not 
lead others to doubt that they acknowledge the authority of the public 
conception of justice. If doubts never arise, the proviso is never triggered and 
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they need do nothing more” (Weithman, 2010, 330). So, citizens are 
permitted to introduce into public political debate unshared non-public 
reasons as long as there is unified perspective of shared public reasons by 
which they can justify their proposal to others if they are asked to do so.  
Let’s see argumentation so far. First, I accepted the establishment of 
legitimate authority of institutions on the basis of natural duty of justice. 
Natural duty of justice claims that we have a duty to comply with just 
institutions when they exist and further just arrangements not yet 
established if it does not demand too much cost from ourselves. These 
positive duties have its negative correlates in duty not to impose unfair 
burdens to others and duty not to collaborate or support unjust 
arrangements. Then I tried to show how recognition of reasonable pluralism 
where there are many perfect conceptions of justice places obstacles on view 
that natural duty of justice simply demands from us to conceive just 
arrangement as one that implements our own perfect conception of justice. In 
circumstances of reasonable pluralism principle of liberal legitimacy, or now 
we can say public reason, demands that we have to comply with institutions 
which implement reasonable conception of justice where reasonable refers to 
notion of political reasonableness – that it is based on political values of 
freedom, equality, fairness. In liberal institutions through which citizens as 
collective body exercise their political power they must do it by respecting 
liberal principle of legitimacy, i.e. by respecting boundaries of public reason. 
In other words, citizens legitimately use their political power when they 
respect moral duty of civility. Thus, natural duty of justice as principle for 
individuals in circumstances of reasonable pluralism manifests itself in 
another principle for individuals – moral duty of civility. Duty of civility has 
its moral grounding in natural duty of justice.  
The claim that duty of civility has its normative force in natural duty of 
justice is easier to understand if we compare these duties. First, political 
decisions reached by respecting duty of civility, which means by respecting 
the boundaries of public reason, are binding and legitimate even if these 
decisions do not reflect or are in contrast to some comprehensive teaching or 
perfect conception of justice. According to what has been argued above, 
natural duty of justice implies that citizens have duty to comply with 
institutions that implement reasonable conception of justice which is based 
on political ideas of fair social cooperation between free and equal citizens 
and respects reasonable pluralism. That is the reason why citizens who fulfill 
moral duty of civility exercise their political power legitimately which gives 
them authority to bind and if necessary to coerce unreasonable citizens 
through their shared institutions. Unreasonable citizens, on this account, 
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cannot simply say that they do not accept boundaries of public reason 
because it is equal to saying that they do not accept their natural duty of 
justice or that they do not accept reasonable pluralism. Both things are by 
definition wrong, former is wrong because natural duty does not depend on 
voluntary acceptance of it and latter is wrong because it invokes political 
oppression over other free and equal citizens.9 Of course, moral duty of 
civility implies that reasonable citizens also have to accept as binding and 
legitimate decisions that are different from those they defended. Respecting 
duty of civility and public reason does not require for decisions to be 
legitimate that there is consensus on them. In Rawls’ own words:  
“Reasonable political conceptions do not always lead to the same 
conclusions, nor do citizens holding the same conception always agree on 
particular political issues. Yet the outcome of a vote is seen to be reasonable 
provided all citizens of a reasonably just constitutional regime sincerely vote 
in accordance with the idea of public reason. This doesn’t mean the outcome 
is true or correct, but it is for the moment reasonable and binding on citizens 
by the majority principle” (Rawls, 1996, lvi). 
Here we can emphasize what we already said about difference of justice 
and legitimacy. Justice refers to set of conditions to which political society 
and citizens should strive for, and it is inevitable in plural society that there 
will be certain disagreement about principles of justice and even among 
people who endorse same principles of justice there will be disagreement 
about which conditions or policies satisfy these principles best. On the other 
hand, legitimacy sets a minimum standard that has to be achieved for basic 
institutions to command morally the compliance of citizens with the laws and 
policies that issue from it. In a social world where there is inevitable 
disagreement about justice, the gap between justice and legitimacy is 
necessary in order to allow for honest political disagreement but in the same 
time to make sure that every outcome fits the terms of fair social 
cooperation. So, if citizens are under natural duty of justice to comply with 
just institutions, and institutions are just when they assure fair social 
cooperation in circumstances of reasonable pluralism, then citizens are under 
duty to respect duty of civility when they advocate or vote for policies they 
consider to be just. That is why above mentioned characteristics – epistemic 
restraint and principle of sincerity – are important for fulfilling duty of 
civility. How can one citizen demand from another citizen to abide or comply 
                                                            
9 This does not imply that unreasonable citizens should be ignored. Ignorance or isolation 
of them can produce more extreme group polarization that can be threat for stability in 
society. There are many ways how dialogue with these groups can be pursued in the non 
formal public forums, and it would be politically wise to do it.  
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with the law or policy that is based on doctrinal reasons or that is 
manipulation or paternalism? In the former case epistemic restraint is not 
respected so we have case of expert/boss fallacy, and in a latter case principle 
of sincerity is not respected and we do not behave toward other person as free 
and equal citizen.  
Now we can compare duty of civility with second duty of justice and that 
is duty to further just arrangements if this does not place too much cost on 
ourselves. Here, the above mentioned gap between justice and legitimacy is 
also telling. If justice refers to set of conditions we should strive for and 
legitimacy refers to minimum standard every conception must satisfy, then 
our striving for justice must be within limits of legitimacy. Limits of 
legitimacy are boundaries of public reason. Thus, we can fulfill our second 
duty of justice in circumstances of reasonable pluralism only if we respect 
moral duty of civility. This also implies that if we violate duty of civility in 
imposing conditions we claim to be just then we are violating negative 
correlate of second duty of justice because we collaborate or support 
institutions that other reasonable citizens see as unjust. Unjust here does not 
mean that it is not perfectly just but that it is not reasonably just. In this 
case they do not see how natural duty of justice can demand that they 
comply with these laws or policies. 
I believe that in grounding duty of civility in natural duty of justice 
political liberals can answer to some problems that can be presented against 
the idea of public reason. Problems to which I am referring are that it is not 
clear how boundaries of public reason are appropriate for correcting some 
severe violations of rights or economic injustices. Namely, arguments against 
many violations of rights in the past were based in religious arguments – 
Martin Luther King invoked many religious arguments against racism; 
abolitionists also claimed that slavery is heinous sin on basis of evangelical 
Protestantism; some Catholic bishops argued against euthanasia and 
sterilization programs in Third Reich on Christian arguments. Were they 
breaking the boundaries of public reason and disrespecting duty of civility 
when they were arguing on religious grounds for laws and policies that would 
stop slavery, racial aggregation or non-voluntary euthanasia of mentally 
handicapped? If their arguments were seriously taken to justify laws and 
policies that would stop such clearly unjust institutions do these laws, 
policies and also institutions that implement them pose problems that we 
mention above?10 I think that the answer to those questions is negative. First 
of all, it is hard to talk about breaking the boundaries of public reason and 
disrespecting duty of civility in circumstances of grave injustice where basic 
                                                            
10 This is for example what Sandel claims in Sandel (1994). 
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rights and liberties are not being respected by existing institutions. In these 
cases we don’t have circumstances of reasonable pluralism or reasonable 
disagreement to which these ideas apply, we have clearly unjust and 
unreasonable institutions that gravely violate human rights and here we 
have urgent task to design institutions under which reasonable disagreement 
can occur. So, it is very important to see the circumstances within which 
King, abolitionists and German Catholic Church were acting. These were the 
circumstances of deep injustice in which it was necessary to establish 
institutions that protect basic human rights, and not primarily to solve 
problems of reasonable disagreement. Circumstances are very important in 
understanding the idea of public reason and duty of civility. Rawls is also 
clear in noticing the importance of circumstances, he says that “under 
different conditions with different doctrines and practices, the ideal [of public 
reason] may best be achieved in different ways, in good times by following 
what at first sight may appear to be the exclusive view, in less good times 
what may appear to be more inclusive view”(Rawls, 1996, 251). Thus, we can 
say that in good times we are bounded by duty of civility to respect exclusive 
view according to which we argue for laws and policies only in terms of public 
reasons while in less good times we are allowed to argue on terms of our 
comprehensive reasons to further just arrangements and in this way fulfill 
our duty of justice. Nonpublic reasons can well serve to mobilize citizens and 
their consciousness to resist and correct clearly unjust practices. 
Argumentations for laws and policies will be more inclusive for nonpublic 
reasons if institutional injustice is more severe. It would be crazy for political 
liberals to say that argument based on Christian reasons were unreasonable if 
their purpose was to mobilize citizens to resist, for example politics of 
eugenics and euthanasia in Third Reich. On the other hand, these same 
arguments will show that citizens do not respect their duty of civility if they 
use them as premises in public justification of politics that will, for example 
stop stem-cell research in circumstances of reasonable disagreement. It would 
be unreasonable and oppressive to obstruct beneficial medical treatment on 
the basis of believe that we cannot reasonably expect that all citizens accept 
– namely, that it is intrinsically bad to destroy five days old artificially 
fertilized human egg by taking cells from it. It is wrong to compare these 
cases with cases of killing persons with Down syndrome, or violate person’s 
rights because of her race or ethnicity. In former case we have reasonable 
disagreement while in the latter cases we have only disagreement where one 
side is clearly unreasonable and our duty is to stop this group from imposing 
further harm.  
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Also, it is hard to see how in these circumstances political acts of King, 
abolitionists and Catholic Church can lead reasonable atheists or agnostics to 
doubt that they accept same political values as they do. It is easy to find 
public reasons for their causes. Of equal importance is that overwhelming 
majority of citizens to whom they were addressing were Christians. It is not 
contrary to idea of public reason to present argument how comprehensive 
doctrines which citizens accept can confirm or how they are compatible with 
reasonable political values.11 So, in this case we have Christians addressing to 
Christians using arguments from Christianity.  
Thus, duty of civility applies to us in circumstances where basic structure 
respects three liberal principles we mentioned above – it respects basic rights 
and liberties; assignes them priority and provides all-purpose means for 
citizens to make use of those rights and liberties. When our institutions are 
not in accordance with these principles then we are under duty of justice to 
design our institutions that will implement these principles. In designing 
these institutions citizens are allowed to argue from their comprehensive 
views. So, it is wrong to conclude that political liberalism is in contrast to 
such argumentation. On the contrary, in many cases where just institutions 
do not exist comprehensive argumentation can serve to design this 
institution and in this way to lead to the circumstances of liberal public 
reasoning where duty of civility is binding.  
In discussion so far I said that cases for nonpublic reasons to serve as 
premises in political argumentation are cases where it is clear that grave 
injustice is happening. This implies that it is important to give some 
principled reason for dividing cases of clear injustice and reasonable 
disagreement about justice. For this reason I will to focus now on problems of 
distributive justice where this boundary is most visible. It is clear that Rawls 
himself was always devoted to his two principles of justice that include fair 
equality of opportunity and difference principle.12 But, in Political liberalism 
he writes that liberal constitution should beside basic rights and liberties 
guarantee only formal equality of opportunity and social minimum (what is 
also known in capitalist welfare state as ‘safety net’) – this is what he calls 
                                                            
11 This what Rawls calls reasoning from conjecture. See Rawls (1997/1999, 591). 
12 Fair equality of opportunity is more demanding than formal equality of opportunity 
because it demands more positive actions to secure basis of equal opportunity while formal 
equality of opportunity demand only negative actions is a sense of removing formal 
obstacles to “careers open to talents“. Difference principle claims that economic 
inequalities are justified only if they maximize position of the worst positioned group in 
society. 
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constitutional essentials.13 He has left fair equality of opportunity and 
stronger distributive principles (such as difference principle, but also other 
principles that more strongly regulate social and economic inequalities) to be 
realized not on constitutional level but on legislative level as part of what he 
calls matters of basic justice. There are three interconnected reasons why he 
didn’t demand these economic principles to be part of constitutional 
essentials. First one is that basic rights, equality of opportunity and social 
minimum are more urgent to establish and be protected in every reasonably 
just state, they define threshold below which basic structure is considered to 
be illegitimate. Constitution that does not guarantee these three things is not 
legitimate worthy constitution, and society where these essentials are 
violated is society where citizens are not under duty to comply with these 
institutions. Second reason is that those essentials are more transparent, 
meaning that it is easier to apply this essentials and that it is easier to tell 
and agree if they are respected.14 It is easier to notice that institution is 
violating core contents of basic liberal rights, formal equality of opportunity 
and provision of social minimum then if it respects requirements of fair 
equality of opportunity and some stronger distributive principle. These 
requirements are much more complex and debatable, and it is hard to 
observe if they are met. Third reason is that because there will be reasonable 
disagreement about the question how much is needed to be provided for fair 
equality of opportunity to be met. It will be illegitimate to impose certain 
standard of justice through constitution when these questions should be 
answered through public deliberation on legislative level. These three reasons 
– urgency, transparency and reasonable disagreement about justice – show 
why it is allowed to use non-public reasons in circumstances we mentioned 
above. In these cases it was transparent that basic rights have been violated, 
that is why it was urgent to establish reasonably just institutions where 
reasonable disagreement can occur. It was demand of natural duty of justice 
to establish such institutions. But, when basic structure is arranged 
according to legitimate constitution then moral duty of civility takes the role 
that natural duty of justice unbounded by public reason had before this 
constitution was established and respected.  
                                                            
13 Most controversial thing among constituional essentials is social minimum, but as Cass 
Sunstein writes: “Before the twentieth century, democratic constitutions made no 
mention of rights to food, shelter, and health care. A remarkable feature of international 
opinion –indeed a near consenus-is that socioeconomic rights deserve constitutional 
protection. The principal exception to the consensus is the United States, where most 
people think that such rights do not belong in a constitution“(Sunstein, 2001, 221). 
14 For more on arguemnt of urgency and transparency see Pogge (2007, 148-153). 
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Saying that institutions that implement constitutional essentials are 
legitimate mean that citizens have duty to comply with them even when 
some political decisions, and here I refer to decisions concerning distributive 
justice, do not meet their particular standards of justice. But, crucial thing to 
emphasize is that this is only minimum that must be satisfied for constitution 
to be legitimate; we can say that basic structure is minimally reasonably just if 
it simply respects constitutional essentials. Arrangements that violate basic 
rights and liberties, discriminate some group by not securing formal equality 
of opportunity or arrangements that deprive some citizens from social 
minimum and letting those to starve or unnecessary suffer are clearly unjust 
arrangements that we do not have duty to comply with. But, arrangement 
that satisfies only constitutional essential does not define social cooperation 
that is considered to be just. As we saw above, arguments for certain issues to 
be constitutional essentials is not that these issues are more important as 
matters of justice than stronger demands like fair equality of opportunity or 
distributive principle. Argument for constitutional essentials is that they are 
more urgent, more transparent and are not subject of reasonable 
disagreement. These arguments do not imply that for society to be just there 
does not to be settled an answer to matters of basic justice such as more fair 
equality of opportunity or some distributive principle that does not have to 
be difference principle but some principle that is based on mutuality. That 
arrangement is minimally reasonably just does not mean that arrangement is 
just and it would be wrong to understand it that way.  
In minimally reasonably just arrangement citizen are still under a 
natural duty of justice to further more just arrangements. They are also 
under negative duty not to support institutions that foreseeable and 
avoidably cause injustice. Minimally reasonably just arrangement simply 
means that citizens cannot use all means in striving for justice like in 
unreasonably unjust arrangements, but only that they can fulfill their 
natural duty of justice in furthering just arrangements by respecting moral 
duty of civility. This implies, for example, that citizens with more egalitarian 
conceptions cannot impose on others ‘difference principle’ through some 
edicts or through revolution even though they consider it as the most just 
principle than any other. Reason for this is that there are other reasonable 
principles of distributive justice.15 
But, certainly arrangement that lacks any kind of distributive principle 
except provision of social minimum is society that will hardly be in 
accordance with political value of fair social cooperation between free and 
                                                            
15 For example principle of restricted utility that Waldron defends in Waldron (1986, 27-
32). 
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equal citizen. Equality in this context primarily refers to political equality or 
democratic equality according to which everybody is entitled to capabilities 
required to evade oppressive and exploitative social relationships and to live 
as human beings who can pursue their own conceptions of the good and 
participate in the social, economic and political life.16 This is important to 
satisfy conception of justice as reciprocity. Taking value of equality as 
political value will also imply distributive demands that can be presented in 
terms of public reasons: 
“Even if basic needs have been met [social minimum], a society cannot 
be considered a society of equals if the resources that individuals have 
available to pursue their most cherished ends is left entirely at the mercy of 
market forces. Moreover, significant distributive inequalities all too easily 
generate inequalities of power and status that are incompatible with relations 
among equals. Thus, those who accept the social and political ideal of 
equality will have compelling [public] reasons to avoid excessive variations in 
people’s shares of income and wealth, and this will mean, among other things 
that they have [public] reason to oppose institutions that allow too much 
scope for differences in people’s natural and social circumstances to translate 
into economic inequalities” (Scheffler, 2003, 22). 
Thus, under minimally reasonably just arrangement citizens are under 
duty of justice to further just arrangements because they are not yet 
established solely by respecting constitutional essentials. For arrangement to 
be more than minimally just it must include also matters of basic justice like 
more substantive equality of opportunity and some distributive principle. 
Without these principles political value of fair social cooperation and political 
value of equality will not be realizable. So, even if imposing certain concrete 
principle of distribution will be in contrast with duty of civility, arrangement 
without some such principle will also be in contrast to duty of civility 
because it will be in contrast with values which we have a duty as citizens of 
liberal democracies to promote for our social cooperation to be based on 
reciprocity.  
Let’s put these arguments like this. Institutions that respect only 
constitutional essentials will foreseeable (at least in nowadays capitalist 
societies) promote policies that cause huge inequalities in wealth and income. 
Huge inequalities in wealth and income are harmful to liberal democratic 
values because they tend to make some groups excluded from political 
                                                            
16 This concept of equality is best presented in Anderson (1999).  
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participation and they tend to diminish value of political equality.17 If the 
role of political institutions is to be medium through which citizens exercise 
their collective political power over each other and if citizens should exercise 
their political power only in terms of political values (duty of civility), then 
citizens (or at least some of them) should be aware that they are not fulfilling 
their duty of civility if outcome of institutional arrangement is harmful to 
realization of political values. This particularly refers to citizens in their roles 
as public officials and policy makers, but also to citizens who are receiving 
benefits from this arrangement. 
If economic institutions of nowadays capitalist societies are widening the 
gap between rich and poor then it is hard to see how they satisfy criterion of 
reciprocity.18 Then it is not clear how can citizens who benefit from these 
institutions explain in terms of public reasons why they support these 
institutions and policies to citizens that are in worse position because of 
working of these institutions. This implies that these citizens are violating 
their duty of civility even though they support regime with legitimate 
worthy constitution. Respecting duty of civility in circumstances of 
nowadays capitalist societies means to support institutional arrangement or 
economic policies that can correct actual situation in direction which will 
guarantee fair value of political participation that is necessary for 
reciprocity.  
Good example can be income tax policies. Are citizens violating their 
duty of civility when they support policy of lower income tax? In certain 
circumstances that policy can be publicly justified. Rawls himself writes that 
such policy can even be in accordance with difference principle.19 
Justification for this policy can be that lower rate of income tax will 
motivate talented and productive citizens to be more efficient in producing 
extra good that will be distributed in a way that makes everyone better. But, 
in actual circumstances, as Colin Farrelly claims, it is not true that unjust 
inequalities in society are caused by the problem of efficiency. In actual 
circumstances inequalities are caused by “for example, unequal opportunities 
in education, a gender structure which has created substantial inequalities 
between the sexes and unjust inheritance laws” (Farrelly, 2007, 105). And if 
it is true that “raising revenue through taxation is likely to be a necessary 
measure in any serious effort to remedy the substantial injustices that exist 
                                                            
17 Rawls is explicit in saying that huge economic inequalities will have bad political effects 
in making some groups sullen and resentfull or excluded from political processes. See 
Rawls (2001, 128).  
18 Datas that this is actually happening can be found in OECD (2011). 
19 See Rawls (2001, 161). 
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in the current social structure of capitalist societies” (Ibidem) then citizens 
violate their duty of civility when they support initiatives for lower rate of 
income tax.  
At the end I want to emphasize that this argument is different from 
similar arguments which claim that principles of justice apply to individuals 
themselves and not to institutions. Most famous argument of this kind is 
G.A. Cohen’s argument that difference principle applies to individual’s 
choices because it must be internalized as individual’s ethos.20 My argument 
differs from Cohen’s because I do not demand that what has to be 
internalized is some particular principle as, for example, difference principle. 
There are reasonable citizens that do not accept difference principle and it 
would be contrary to political liberalism to claim that they are unjust. What 
I think every reasonable citizen must internalize are political values of 
freedom, equality and fairness that shape some kind of political ethos which 
manifests itself in pressing institutions in realizing this values according to 
her relative situation. From some citizens it will demand more than from 
others because they are in better situation to do it, but also it will demand 
more in bad times (in which actual societies are currently at least according 
to economic situation) and less in better times (in which it will not be 
necessary to support, for example, higher income tax policies). 
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